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To the Test of Social  
and Political Violence
From the Kenya of Millionaires  
and Millions of Beggars to the Three Kenyas  
of the Twenty-First Century
Christian Thibon
Translated by Catriona Bell
“The eyes of a starving child,” “Kenya has become a nation of ten millionaires 
and ten million beggars”: these lines from Josiah Mwangi Kariuki’s most 
often-quoted speeches are fitting anecdotal hooks to begin this chapter. 
Such critical views concern two historical periods: firstly in 1962 when 
Kenya was assessing its colonial era, and then at the beginning of the 
1970s during the first decade of independence with its many people “left 
out in the cold,” that is, beggars as well as reliant vulnerable people. Such 
words—both critical and provocative, sensitive and political—reflect the life 
and political trajectory of Kariuki, a nationalist, progressive and populist 
leader, incidentally a millionaire, who was assassinated on 2 March 1975. 
His position was brilliantly taken up by a generation of intellectuals and 
especially in the novels from the new Kenyan school, also known as the 
Postcolonial Kenyan novels, which include amongst others Meja Mwangi, 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Charles Mangua, and Grace Ogot. These literary 
works embrace critical social realism and target the ruling elite. They do 
not simply resound with post-independence disappointment, but reflect a 
deeper dissonance, both urban and rural, against the backdrop of a culture 
clash, of a tension between tradition and modernity, as well as of the 
political deadlock (Kabayi 1998; Kurtz 1998). In this way these works are as 
lucid about the first two decades of independence as they are foreboding of 
the subsequent changes that Kenyan society is presently experiencing—a 
premonitory mode of thinking which only artists have the gift of.
In 2020, nearly half a century later, how relevant are these observations? 
And to what extent have social changes over the last thirty years confirmed 
or changed such social polarisation? Do these changes weigh on the identity 




At first glance these images and discourses are still relevant today. 
Various elements appear to confirm this idea in spite today’s nature-
oriented and tourist-aimed marketing with its stereotyped ethnic 
categories (including the archetypal serene “Masai Warrior”) as well as 
more distant and cautious photo reportages, somewhat blur the picture.1 
Media buzz perpetuates these images with titles such as “Kibera—Africa’s 
largest slum” (Desgroppes & Taupin 2011) or “Dabaab, the world’s largest 
refugee camp,” for example. Reports also abound about the daily life and 
suffering of many, which are usually intertwined if we pay close attention. 
Take for instance the chokoras (street children) “who rummage through 
waste,” or “the stone breakers” who work by the roadside. And last, fear 
prevails because of the violence of gangs and urban ghettos’ militias as 
well as, in pastoral areas, of livestock thieves. Conversely, other images 
offer an optimistic vision, and hopes of success, even if only in their 
beginning stage. They shed light on the proliferation of malls, the digital 
revolution, and the housing bubble and urban growth, which a political 
communication that promotes national success emphasises even further… 
And minor news items back up these major successes as well, such as the 
broadcasting of the import of mechanical crushers—crushers that should 
bring an end to the slave-labour conditions of stone breakers! Yet such 
emergent modernity brings in offensive situations exemplified by the 
ostentatious and mediatised lifestyle of some millionaire tycoons which 
urban and rural legends tell about. Recent opinion polls2 have recently 
revealed a divide in public opinion between the confidently hopeful and 
the despairingly suspicious in the face of the unknown, between Saint 
Valentine’s Day—a rose business success story as well as a reflection of a 
new individualised lifestyle—and recurring fears generated by the rising 
cost of living, corruption and violence, and the risk of famine in the 
pastoral North of the country.
The social question and the condemnation of injustices remain as 
prevalent in political speeches as in some clerics’ sermons, intellectuals’ 
accounts, journalists’ reports and in the sharp satire of caricaturists.3 Even 
if these messages have lost their original radical nationalist ideology or 
Marxist leanings and its political spokesmen, their capacity to mobilise, 
1. These photographic works, which are both exhibited and published, have 
been on the rise in recent years. They aim to visually capture social issues, 
the rise of the middle class, etc., by adopting an aesthetics of the everyday that 
aligns with a strong commitment to fight human suffering.
2. Opinion polls from Ipsos Synovate are available on their website: http://www.
ipsos.com/fr-fr/toutes-les-publications.
3. Among others, the works of cartoonist Gado in The Daily Nation.
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young people in particular, through the new mass culture4 remains intact. 
At the same time, the arguments have changed. We find many more 
moralistic denunciations of deviances from televangelists or elders. We also 
find ethnic recriminations which focus on access to land and spoliation, 
that is, on the “land question”—whether it concerns rural or urban dwellers. 
Categorial and sectorial claims have arisen to defend certain professions. 
And millenarian revolts have reappeared and are taking roundabout routes.5 
In a society deeply marked by political debates and becoming more and 
more a show-society—due to the importance taken by the media and social 
networks—, these images and speeches are of tremendous importance, 
even more because they feed in people’s conscious and unconscious 
attitudes: indeed, they bring to light a division within Kenyan society, and 
in the urban world in particular, that would increasingly become rigid and 
could potentially result in explosive fractures. It is noteworthy that, in 
contrast to the independence years when the modern-urban world and 
the traditional-rural world were split and distinct, nowadays this half-
world where wealth is neighbouring poverty increases frustrations among 
those who cannot access the enrichment they see but from which they are 
banned, as much in the cities as in the countryside.
Whatever comments are made about them, these imaginaries, sometimes 
overstated, get revitalised through real-life experience: they relate to 
objective realities. In order to capture them, it is possible to use statistics, 
maps and sociological data based upon social and economic monitoring 
and observations. From the 1990s, multiple sources offer information that 
is global and national, but also sectoral and regional or even local.6 These 
series are mapped—and thus somewhat dramatised. They raise questions 
regarding the permanence as well as the dynamics and causes of the 
changes observed.
4. Songs and music such as benga or reggae, theatre, and the urban language of 
the ghettos, Sheng.
5. This includes the great increase in urban and rural militias, vigilantes, and 
urban gangs, some of which spread millenarian claims and expectations, in 
particular the Mungiki, in the 1990s-2000s.
6. The data provided here are extracted from international and national agencies 
reports, public or accessible online, such as: census data, data from KNBS (annual 
statistics and Basic report on well-being in Kenya), from KIBHS and from KPHC, 
financial, demographic and health surveys from DHS, economic surveys from 
BM, WHO, Unicef; finally, from SID, the Society for International Development, 
and from some NGOs such as Oxfam; see KNBS-SID (2013).
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1. The Poverty-Growth-Inequalities Triangle
An initial macroeconomic social response, supplemented by a more bird-
eye-view observation, confirms finding and brings further nuance it to it 
at the same time. On the one hand, Kenya remains a nation of millionaires, 
some of whom have become billionaires, and the land of a politico-economic 
monopoly which, for some of its actors, is entering its third generation. 
This is evidenced by the consolidation of politico-economic dynasties 
successively put in place by each new governmental team, the saga of 
political entrepreneurs as well as the family trajectories of industrial or 
agribusiness entrepreneurs, and the trajectories of individuals—who can be 
called “tycoons”—who are hard-working or lucky magnates. More recently 
the success of wealthy urbanites in real estate, services and finance has 
been as rapid as urban legends would have it and sometimes the financial 
scandals that come up with them. Incidentally, these individuals now exceed 
the 200 families of the politico-economic clique - listed7 in a register that 
the media and social networks regularly update. They were said to be about 
9,400 individuals in 2016, which represents a 95% increase between 2006 
and 2016, according to African Wealth Report, pulling consumption and 
investment upwards… according to a consumerist trend which supposedly 
attract “up-market” tourists and rich foreign residents to the Indian Ocean 
coast followed by celebrity magazines and national tabloids.
On the other hand, “the beggars” are still there, yet perhaps less visible 
than in the past. However, the poverty and structural vulnerabilities remain 
prevalent, so much so that the last great famines of a recent past, like those 
from 1984–85, still resonated in the 2010s as shown by the increasing 
price of ugali flour and food shortages. Furthermore, climate change and 
its local variations stress the structural constraints, clearly evident in the 
arid or semi-arid northern part of the country and continue to impact 
communities with a high population growth. Knowledge about these 
destitute populations has increased as well the categorisation they are 
subject to. As early as 1999, the National Poverty Eradication Plan8 targeted 
the following groups: farmers without land, disabled people, female headed 
households, farming communities in semi-arid regions, AIDS orphans, 
street children, and beggars. In 2015, there were 3.6 million orphans and 
vulnerable children (OVC), 0.41 million internally displaced people owing 
7. See Verdier (2013), Kenya Private Sector Alliance (2013), “Kenya, les cercles 
d’affaires des décideurs.” 2012. La Lettre de l’océan Indien – Insiders, 16 November.
8. This 15-year plan was presented in February 1999 under Daniel arap Moi’s 
presidency. It followed on from the World Congress in Copenhagen, right after 
the Structural Adjustment Plans (1993) that announced the adoption of poverty-
reduction policies.
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to “political or natural reasons” (IDP), 0.48 million registered refugees, and 
3.6% to 4.6% of the national population living with a disability (2008 survey 
and 2009 national census). The undernourished population is estimated at 
9.6 million, out of a population of 46 million, while the numbers of farmers 
without land—more difficult to discern as figures does not take into account 
young people without unemployment who are often moving around, if not 
migrants—made up 10% of the farm workers in 2004.9 Finally one third 
of households are headed by women, but this measure refers to various 
situations of dependency or vulnerability as well as autonomy, notably in 
the cities, thus not exclusively a measure of heads of poor households.
On a regular basis, large national surveys progressively follow one after 
the other, even more with the launch of national plans to eradicate poverty.10 
They provide quantitative data that records and follows the evolutions, 
allowing us to reconstruct historical trends, to classify the chronic nature 
of poverty, to identify populations below the poverty line, and to assess 
the persistence of extreme poverty and the levels of prevalence of hunger. 
General trends come out from these datasets. Beginning in the 1990s, but 
starting earlier in the 1980s, a general deterioration of key indications 
is visible (poverty levels, hunger, demographic indicators) with regional 
and cyclical patterns revealing the impact of droughts, prices and socio-
political conflicts. The concurrence of an economic depression, structural 
adjustment programs, an AIDS epidemic followed by political crises in 
time of transition reduced the number of public jobs, thus doubling the 
number of poor people that rose from 25% to 56.8% (44% in the cities) as 
well as of people living below the poverty line between 1972 and 2000. Life 
expectancy went downward from 59 to 54 years and the average income 
per resident reduced from 360 USD to 306 USD between 1989 and 2000.
A key fact, these curves reversed from 2002–2004. The changes to 
the trends are slow but lasting whilst at the same time macroeconomic 
indicators (growth rate and GDP) are returning to growth. This general 
improvement includes vital indicators, such as life expectancy and the 
prevalence of hunger which has gone from 30% of the population on 
average in the 1990s to 21% in 2015. The same is true for the number of poor 
people that has slightly fallen from 56.8% in 2000 to 46% in 2006, followed 
by 45% in 20009 and 32% in 2015–2016. Yet this remains a high number: 
nearly 16 to 17 million people, of which 1.5 to 2 million Nairobi dwellers 
out of 3.5 million. It is also the case for extreme poverty which has fall off 
from 19.5% to 8.5% between 2005 and 2015–16.
9. The land data are a special case in Kenya’s statistics as it is always approximate.
10. They target the OVC, disabled groups, populations living in arid and semi-
arid zones, and more recently dependent elderly populations.
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This new course is linked to the return of economic growth and a sustained 
increase in the average per capita income, despite the high population 
growth, which rose from less than 500 USD to 743 USD in 2006, 1,000 USD 
in 2010 and 1,432 USD in 2015 (World Bank data). The improvement is more 
modest when calculated and compared in Kenyan currency and current 
exchange rates, taking into consideration inflation: this is the case between 
2004 and 2011, from 37,000 to 76,500 KES per year, from 35,000 to 39,000 KES 
per year11 (KIPPRA 2015). Moreover, inflation and the cost of urban living 
are eroding urban income growth. Purchasing power is affected by natural 
crises—for instance provoking the growth in price of maize—as well as 
political crises. Thus, in the months following the post-election crisis of 
2007–2008, the capital experienced a half yearly inflation rate of 25-30%, a 
situation which is repeated with each electoral period.
Furthermore, in the 2000s, characterised by the rise of an emerging 
economy or at least by Kenya’s ascension to the rank of middle-income 
country, the gap between beneficiaries and those excluded from the fallout 
of the growth became obvious. This differential, if not this social inequality—
described in budgetary as well as demographic and health surveys (DHS) 
through socio-economic characteristics, goods, uses, domestic equipment 
and the asset base of each household—is captured by the statistical 
measure of the income gap, estimated at 0.416 in 2018 by the Gini index. 
This measure, albeit high, is well below that of other southern and central 
African countries12 and tends to dip in the countryside, but remains high 
in the cities where the wealth is concentrated. In 2016 the first quintile of 
the population (e.g. the richest 20%) had access to 56% of income whilst the 
bottom quintile (e.g. the poorest 20%) had only 4%, and in the cities the first 
two quintiles had access to 90% of income (data from KBS Basic Report on 
Well-being in Kenya).
Another measure of inequality is derived by examining paid employment 
or self-employment—be it formal or informal work—and wage conditions, 
which both reveal structural constraints and positive development, even 
with distortions. Due to the population growth and the inertia of these 
trends, the number of employees, a measure smaller than the total working 
population, doubles every 6 to 7 years: 1.5  million in 1986, 3  million in 
1993, 6 million in 2000 and the figure reached 10 million in 2008, whilst 
the ratio of employees to working population (men 78%, women 67% and 
young people 69%) vary only slightly as well as the distribution by sector 
of activity.
11. See data in KIPPRA (2013), IEA (2010) and ADB-GoK (2013).
12. For an emerging country, Kenya, like Tanzania, is within the average. The 
highest index is found in South Africa.
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In addition to the weight of population growth, the sets calculated 
from official data (data from Republic of Kenya Economics Survey) show 
a dramatic turnaround. Starting from the 1990s, the formal sector dropped 
heavily, starting from 79% in 1986 to 19.5% in 2008, then 17% in 2017. The 
informal economy thus absorbs the growth and the subsequent effects of 
public policies (PAS from 1993 to 1997).
Therefore, in less than ten years, Kenya has shifted from a country of 
salaried employees, with a certain level of security, to a country of self-
employed or informal workers, and from a mixed regulated economy to 
a liberal economy. Part of the urban working classes, composed of public 
and private sector employees, dismissed public officials and workers—are 
weakened, without protection whilst their unions, impaired or controlled 
by the regime, fall back to defending their trades (Leitner 1973; Sandbrook 
1975; Smonini 2009). The informal economy has consequently seen a sharp 
increase from 0.5 million in 1990 to 4.2 million in 2000, 6.1 million in 2006, 
9.2 in 2011, and 13.3  million in 2017. This situation accounts for 83% of 
economic activity and 70% of GDP. Yet it cuts across different situations: 
it comprises activities either in the process of becoming formal services or 
professions in certain fields, but also situations of survival and structural 
insecurity. Finally, youth unemployment is estimated between 17 and 58% 
of all the “youth,” depending on how this category is defined, which is one 
of the highest in the region.13 Nevertheless the formal salaried economy, 
private as well as public, experienced a relative increase: between 2004 
and 2015 it rose from 1.7 to 2.1 million, whilst during the same period, the 
employment share in the tertiary sector rose from 48% to 52% and that of 
the secondary sector stayed constant (ADB-GoK 2013).
The analysis of income redistribution through work is only possible 
for the formal sector, which at first glance is rather privileged compared 
to the informal sector: it reflects general inequalities. There is a high 
differential between high and median wages, in the public as well as the 
private sector, which is better able to acknowledge skills and qualifications, 
with underpaid categories in the public sector (such as the teaching and 
medical professions), so much so that the practice of working two jobs has 
become common even if public sector jobs are sought after for the security 
they offer. In the cities, the formal economy, as outlined by a retrospective 
study of urban biographies, remains the desired horizon (Bocquier 2003), 
but certain areas of the informal economy are the levers of growth, such as 
specific services, industries and urban start-ups.
This statistical and qualitative data reveals strong new trends, confirmed 
by the growth in financial assets (goods and services) and consumption 
levels among intermediate incomes. It even shows the emergence of new 
13. 55% according to Awiti & Scott (2016).
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social strata whose living standards correspond with the two top quintiles, 
which are “the richest” from the DHS budgetary surveys. Moreover, the 
statistical indicators evaluating since 2002 the social distribution of cultural 
capital, access to education, levels of schooling, and media access confirm 
the potential for meritocratic social mobility, though they are unequally 
distributed throughout the country. This evolution combined with 
population growth is both an economic and social opportunity for many. 
Most spectacularly is university enrolment, which is growing rapidly14 
although the Kenyan economy struggles to manage this social demand. 
This demographic divide is fuelling an international and recently regional 
migration of Kenyan graduates, resulting in a significant diaspora estimated 
at 3  million people, a sharp increase in the last decade, (corresponding 
to about 9% of the population in 2014). This constitutes an important 
contribution for the economy and society owing to financial transfers. 
Such transfers are indeed the fourth largest provider of foreign exchange 
after tea, horticulture and tourism, as well as an asset for families thanks to 
support provided for schooling, health and real estate costs.
It is obvious that this macro-socio-demographic approach reveals not so 
much a dividing line between the cities and the modern commercial sector 
on one side and the countryside and the traditional subsistence sector on 
the other—as was the case in the decade following independence—but 
between two social spaces or two worlds: the rich and the poor. This reality, 
however, should be approached in ways that avoid the caricatured image of 
“the millionaires and the millions of beggars.”
2. The “Two Kenyas”: Two Worlds, Two Social Spaces
The dividing line that cuts across both the urban and the rural worlds 
is both a power relationship and a relation of proximity. The power 
relationship is characterised by the top benefiting from an abundant 
labour force that is both insecure and underpaid. And the relationship of 
proximity is evidenced by the fact that the rich were former poor or have 
poor relatives in their family. This divide is observable through big-picture 
overviews as well as through detailed observations which recent works of 
socio-demography, social geography and social anthropology provide, and 
most notably those that exploit to the fullest new research methods such as 
the Geographic Information System. Such close-up approaches, associated 
with macro-data, help to draw social landscapes, reveal social structures 
and bring to light social relations. They contribute to spatialising social 
14. The number of students increased from 118,000 in 2007 to more than 400,000 
in 2013. The government thus expected a workforce of 60,000 (or 10% of the 
out-of-school population) by the end of 2010–2020, a figure which was actually 
higher in 2016 with nearly 700,000 students (see Provini 2015).
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polarisation while revealing social nuances and new dynamics of interest 
to all disciplines of humanities and social science seeking to understand 
change and continuity. To do so, they work with various conceptual tools, 
like Pierre Bourdieu’s “social space” or the notions of “space-time-memory” 
of historians and of “identity-territory space” used in social geography.
In recent years, the city has been a particularly studied area because it 
crystallises all inequalities but also all the hopes for initiatives, freedoms, 
diversity and the social rebalancing that it promises. At first glance the 
overall picture is not a rosy one. The capital city and the large cities display 
social and geographic fragmentations (Charton-Bigot & Rodriguez-Torres 
2006). They also bear witness to space injustice in terms of access to 
vital services (Ledant 2013), if not segregation between the upper classes 
gathered in their residential neighbourhoods and the populations of the 
slums. Unlike in the past, cities conceal the masses of street children, even 
families on the street,15 and at the same time host gangs like in South 
American cities. Yet new types of differentiation and stratification are in 
motion, this time in more optimistic ways. They concern even deprived 
neighbourhoods and the spaces that are being built at their edges, as well as 
slums that turn into middle class neighbourhoods. These dynamics bring to 
light an internal line of distinction between residents who can access mass 
consumption, or have just started accessing it, and those who cannot—
mass consumption which an increasing number of malls and shopping 
centres materialise as they are built in affluent neighbourhoods and in 
these new in-between areas. It also separates those who can and those who 
cannot build and secure their property, have access to water, benefit from 
development programs…. Thus, the new urbanised spaces, including some 
slums, still include informal as well as formal housing, mostly rented, but 
also a minority of “non-poor” owners who live above the poverty line. In 
Nairobi, the latter represent 27% of the slum population. A study of urban 
poverty carried out by Oxfam GB in 2009 helped to understand the situation 
of households by distinguishing the “wealthy” whose annual income varies 
between 200,000 and 300,000 KES per year, thus representing 10% of the 
population—which puts them in the middle-class bracket—and the “middle 
poor” with around 100,000 to 200,000 KES per year who represent 20% to 
40% of the population depending on the year considered. These “middle 
poor” represent a median group floating on either side of the poverty 
threshold.16
15. There are about 200,000 street children. According to a national estimate, 
100,000 of them in 2000 in Nairobi and 130,000 in 2009 were driven from 
downtown Nairobi to some slums.
16. The poor, who live under the poverty threshold, relate to two distinct 
groups: the “permanent poor” and the “very poor,” who represent 40% and 10% 
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Social anthropology and social demography, on the one hand, and social 
expertise, on the other, which poverty reduction programs call on, accurately 
describe these two worlds, that is, this spatial bipolarisation described 
above and the distinctions at play. This is the case in Nairobi, between 
and within the urban districts. Take for example the neighbouring districts 
of Muthaiga, the most residential area of the capital, and the Mathare 
and Pangani ghettos, which used to be slums. More generally, marginal 
differences appear in the slums within the different strata of settlement17 
between squatters, tenants and owners, between old-timers and new comers, 
but also between households. Monographs reveal that in slums, which 
have become more and more mono-ethic ghettos following the 2007–2008 
crisis, there is much demographic and economic precariousness, everyday 
instability and family tensions, natural and environmental vulnerabilities, 
prevailing insecurities and the grip of gangs and militias. They also shed 
light on the ways in which sociability, the economy of affection, socio-
cultural cohesion, the creative energy of the “little big men,” and innovative 
or fraudulent accumulations, as Deyssi Rodriguez-Torres shows (2012), do 
prevail. The resilience of the slums dwellers who believe in and hope for a 
future of education for their children, is demonstrated in the high levels of 
pre-primary and primary education, both public and private, so much so 
that in some slums, residents nourish optimistic expectations, according to 
opinion polls.
The findings are the same for the countryside, even though the social 
situations there are not only complex but also divided. In view of this, 
two scenarios can be identified for the agricultural semi-urban spaces 
and centres. There is, on the one hand, an agrarian Kenya that stretches 
from Mombasa to Kisumu, and, on the other, the peripheral areas and 
pastoral North, from the Somali border to the Ugandan border. In the 
agrarian Kenya, farm workers, rural households and farm owners have 
to deal with a difficult process of modernisation—sometimes a complete 
break from and sometimes heir to the traditional model of reproduction—
that is linked to the urban and international market and to cities through 
commuting between towns and the countryside. They simultaneously 
grapple with social confrontation. particularly regarding the land 
question (Argwings-Kodhek 2006). In this regard, the precise measure 
of land inequalities remains unresolved, as it raises questions about the 
privatisation of collective land, spoliation and redistribution, and many 
unknowns concerning land registrations and the legal status of land. But 
respectively (Goodfellow & Taylor 2009)
17. See Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est/The East African Review no. 44, special issue: 
“Slum Upgrading Programmes in Nairobi: Challenges in Implementation.” 2011. 
https://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/509.
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for agriculture-oriented regions (except for pastoral zones within which 
the collective ownership or use of land plays an essential role, and except 
for the public domain where land is often labelled as heritage), data from 
official sources about surveyed land and from national surveys indicate 
blatant inequalities and large gaps over land control. Thus, in 1969, 7% of the 
farm workers owned 34% of agricultural land, a figure which monographs 
have since confirmed. These gaps and inequalities also concern social 
distribution: in 2004, farmers without land, micro-owners, smallholders, 
and large land owners with more than 10 hectares made up respectively 
26%, 50%, 25% and 5% of the total farmers. The “agrarian reforms,” meaning 
the redistribution of land in several waves since independence, as well 
as the support to cooperatives and hydro-agricultural installations, have 
ultimately only benefited a minority of farmers from certain ethnic groups 
(Oucho 200218). They equally benefited large established landowners who 
were able to buy back land put on the market. The reforms have therefore 
not transformed the differentials that were already in place during 
colonisation.19 What they did, however, is to contribute to Africanising 
the large land property and, in some areas of the highlands, to giving rise 
to small and medium-sized land owners, while confining the large former 
colonial properties that have invested in their farms. As a consequence, the 
countryside offers a mixed picture: there is a majority of young landless 
farmers and micro owners, partly as a result from the long-term land 
deprivation established during colonisation but that was not corrected by 
the agrarian reforms of independence; this majority rub shoulders with 
small or medium-sized enterprising properties that have gained from 
the land privatisation that started as soon as the early 1950s. This sort of 
properties also benefited from some subsequent booms, used economic 
niches (e.g. coffee, tea, cereals, horticulture), received support from 
economic policies, and enjoyed opportunities in local markets, in transfers 
with the city and the countryside, and in urban connections based upon 
intergenerational links. These two constituencies of farmers neighbour 
large estates or companies that usually depend on modern technologies 
and form an agrarian power as they act a politico-economic lobby and are 
built upon technical corporate sociability. This agrarian power has been 
strengthened through investment in economic areas, such as tea, cereals, 
horticulture and dairy products, that were more promising than the neo-
colonial private plantations of coffee and their public counterpart in sugar 
production. Their presence is prolonged and strengthened by integrating 
18. See also reports on public good and their registration, notably the Ndung’u 
Report.




or associating with the agri-food industries in the hands of the Asians or 
of the former public cooperatives or companies now privatised.
This evolution contrasts with the pastoral peripheries that are 
still confronted with ordinary fatalities: there people struggle to feed 
themselves and survive. The cyclical poverty tends to become structural 
under the cross-effects and snowball effects of climate vulnerability, the 
restriction of natural resources, the high population growth, and new 
economic and political contexts: the tragedy of the commons is underway. 
It can be associated with statutory degradation (e.g. for a shepherd to lose 
his flock is tantamount to extinction, as it forces him to become a farmer), 
although historically such degradation hit a share of these communities 
only marginally during crises, famine or drought (Anderson & Broch Due 
1999). The capacity for resilience of these pastoralist communities, without 
assistance, is becoming way less effective than before and new modes of 
adaption are weakening the social fabric. Indeed, the marketing of pastoral 
resources (through cattle raiding and cattle rustling), the redistribution-
partitioning of land (between ranches, reserves, and parks), and political 
and geopolitical instability are breaking apart the traditional means of 
survival in communities with high population growth and with internal 
and inter-regional tensions resulting from pastoral migration. In the 
process, groups of the newly wealthy, sometimes migrants, have taken the 
opportunity to monopolise the land to the detriment of local communities, 
playing on ethnic or regional rivalries (Grenier, Bollig & McCabe 2011). 
However, these faraway or even landlocked spaces and times that are so 
different from the centre and have long remained the no man’s land of 
Kenya, are now however becoming more and more connected to it: the 
Masai, Samburu or Turkana “young warriors” understand and speak 
Swahili, if not Sheng. Nevertheless, this assessment must include regional 
nuance. Some pastoral societies in the southern regions, including at least 
some of the Masai, benefit from the extension of new crops, including 
cereals, the meat market, or links with the big cities, such as the opening 
and widening of the regional tourist economy: this Westernisation, partly 
assimilated and controlled, that goes along with the privatisation of land 
and developments through ranches, farms, parks or reserves, happen at the 
expense of some local communities, and even more often at the expense of 
their own culture, resulting in a mobility of circular migration further and 
further away (Péron 1993; Spear & Waller 1993).
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3. Two, Three Kenyas Put to the Test of Reforms, 
Efforts for Well-Being, and the Challenges  
of Public Policy
Public policies for development, social protection and investment in 
the public service, and more generally poverty reduction reforms and, 
following the Constitution, devolution and modernisation as envisaged in 
Vision 2030 can, or might, bring to the whole population what the market 
and new economic growth, based upon an abundant low-cost labour force, 
cannot offer by correcting Kenya’s social and spatial differentials. Yet, the 
effects of these social-cultural policies (education) and social protection 
policies (which includes support to OVC, elderly people, etc.) take time, just 
as the multiplier effects of the major projects of Vision 2030. In addition, 
the assessment of these reform and the measures that accompany it as well 
as the rise in power of the counties have unveiled the multiple facets of 
territorial discrimination and increased awareness of them (Sivi 2013).
However, taking these socio-territorial inequalities into account 
changes how society and its various components see themselves. Poverty 
is no longer defined and perceived solely in monetary terms (income) and 
patrimony (household assets). It now includes access to services, goods, 
knowledge, opportunities to advance and social mobility, insisting on the 
notion of “well-being”: such an indicator is put forward by the calculation 
of human development or methods of equalisation used for the equitable 
calculation of county budgets—somehow in the spirit of a “new Harambee.” 
Moreover, a new measure, the poverty gap, is used to assess how far away 
the standard of living of the poor population at the county level is from 
the national poverty line. It puts in full light the full extent and acuity of 
the social question, in terms of developmental delay in certain counties of 
Kenya. Well-being and the poverty gap, once they are mapped,20 draw social 
spaces and landscapes, less binary and more complex that the rationale of 
the two Kenyas: by crossing economic, patrimonial and access to services 
data, we rather find three Kenyas.
Firstly, there is a Kenya often described as “useful” on the Mombasa-
Kisumu axis. Undoubtedly the winner, it is characterised by an 
overrepresentation of the top national quintile—those who are the “richest” 
according to recent DHS surveys—in Nairobi (67% of the population), in the 
cities (49%), in the central region (32%) and in coastal cities (24%). There, 
the poverty line and the relative poverty gap are the lowest, while the 
regional indicators of human development and well-being are the highest. 
Additionally, for the destitute, access to services and the urban market 
allows hope of meritocratic advancement through school or of climbing the 
20. See the maps available on the websites of SID and KPHC.
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ladder and getting rich thanks to involvement in the informal sector. The 
“useful” Kenya is the country’s hub for consumption and employment. But 
these indicators decline as we move out of the cities: rural poverty is at the 
gates of the major cities, in their suburban peripheries, as well as in coffee 
producing and horticultural areas of paid employment (Kinyanjui 2007).
Secondly, and on the contrary, a Kenya made up of outskirts and 
territorial disparities is emerging: it includes the counties of the northern 
pastoral peripheries, and semi-arid spaces that form an arc of a circle with 
the counties of West Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, Isiolo, Mandera, Wajir, 
Tana river, Garissa as well as Kwale. They have the lowest socio-economic 
indicators (e.g. poverty line and poverty gap, incomes, high gap in the Gini 
index, little secured employment) and are way behind in terms of socio-
cultural development (access to education, water, electricity, etc.). They 
also have the largest number of “the poorest,” making up 73% of their 
population, and the highest poverty intensity (for example 46% in the Tana 
River county versus 4% in Nairobi), whilst their communities are the most 
affected by climate change. Moreover, marginalisation is high, targeting 
the “indigenous peoples,” pastoral societies, hunter-gatherer farmers—
often isolated like the Ogiek and the Yaaku—, and particular ethnic groups 
such as Kenyan-Somalis, evidenced by many reports like the Human Rights 
and the Truth and Reconciliation national commission. These societies 
are somewhat Kenya’s “Third World,” as they are subordinate to both 
objective situations and general perceptions of their status. Last, the fact 
that these areas host refugee camps, for instance Kakuma and Dabaab, and 
have historical geopolitical border instability and recurrent dissidence, 
contributes to this devaluation. It also raises fears because of their higher 
than average population growth rate.
Finally, the third Kenya, somehow set in between, yet the most imposing 
demographically, is sandwiched between the two Kenyas, that is, between 
the useful “winner” and the peripheral “loser.” It is made of the hinterlands 
of the useful Kenya, the coast of The Indian Ocean, the central region, the 
central Rift region, and the western regions, which are all overpopulated 
areas. They correspond to the historical and saturated population centres 
around Mount Kenya, in the Nyanza and Western provinces (e.g. the Kisii 
region), on the Swahili coast and in areas vulnerable to variation in climate 
near arid lands and frequently impacted by droughts. The percentages of 
the “poorest” and the intensity of poverty are higher here, whilst human 
development indicators are average. In particular educational data is above 
average, with the best-performing school districts: in 2016, 13 school 
districts out of the top 20 in the exams for accessing higher education come 
from this area (corresponding to the Kamba, Kikuyu, Meru, Luhya, Nandi, 
and Kalenjin regions), and 7 urban and semi-urban districts have a strong 
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education tradition (among them Nairobi, Mumia, Kakamega, Kisumu, 
and Nyeri).21 This gap between the economic situation and the socio-
cultural indicators explains why education is a priority, if not the object 
of a collective strategy of promotion that includes the urban elite who 
send their children to these renowned schools. This divergence is also the 
cause of internal tensions between young people, women, the often highly 
educated new generations and the established elders, whose authority 
is increasingly contested. These spaces consequently have high levels of 
domestic, neighbourhood, and even political violence that testify to these 
internal tensions. The communities only survive through countryside-town 
circulations, be they permanent migrations or commuting with the centre 
and its cities, and thanks to intergenerational transfers. These exit options 
and also these efforts to keep going with rural society via income transfers 
are not new, going back to the colonial period, but they are reaching their 
limits in some areas, like in the Kisii and the Luhya regions.
The Kenya of today has thus become a case study that illustrates the 
interactive poverty-growth-inequality triangle inherited from the colonial 
time, which the crisis of the 1990s (with adjustment and liberalisation 
programs) have brought to light and which the growth of the 2000s and 
its ill-development have set in motion. The bipolarisation of the “two 
Kenyas”—one with its elite and one with the mass poor—is reproduced and 
maintained, but there are rather “three Kenyas,” that is to say three social 
spaces increasingly distinct and visible, with diverse dynamics regarding 
access to modernisation, different social aspirations (advancement, 
emigration, rural exodus or not), and varied territorial identity, memories, 
and trajectories that pull towards or away from the centre. Furthermore, 
this triangle of growth-inequality-poverty foreshadows a future story, that 
of the emergence of intermediate categories, of a middle class, which hinges 
on redistribution by the market and at least by the state. This transformation, 
which owes both to emergence processes and to social advancement, 
may give rise to a pivotal social class, therefore raising hopes for social 
stabilisation in the not so distant future. Is the old developmentalist dream 
of social stability, of the status quo through growth becoming reality?
But in the immediate future, such bi- or tri-poled scenarios raise fears 
of tensions, if not social conflicts, and exacerbate social pressures given 
the national political and even cultural stalemates. Surprisingly and 
without inferring too easily a colonial legacy or at least a seduction of 
the Kenyan elite by the colonial elite, and in view of some commonalities 
in the education system and religious practices, Kenyan society could be 
considered somewhat “Victorian” with its triptych set against a backdrop 




of wild capitalism: the first part is made of a triumphant and westernised 
oligarchy that includes capitalist-gentlemen but compassionate and open to 
charity; secondly and in contrast, we find a mass of poor people of various 
social and ethnic backgrounds both in urban areas and in the countryside 
whom young migrants constitute a lumpen proletariat, even a potentially 
“dangerous class”; and finally there is an increasing intermediate class 
that can be found both in urban areas and in some rural areas, which we 
can label as “middle class” or petit-bourgeois—yet with no connection to a 
labour aristocracy—whose main characteristics are to be somewhat anxious 
and frustrated by the search and learning of a safe “sweet home” in secure 
compounds but also because of their unmet expectations of a better life.
Today and more so than yesterday, this perspective of social divisions and 
their associated fear, which are the other side of this raw social deal, raise 
questions. On the one hand, how is it possible to overcome the deadlock 
in which the new educated generation are, and which the government and 
international organisations measure through index alerts—with a Gini 
index above 45% and increased levels of youth unemployment? On the 
other hand, and more so, how can the explosive outcome of social mobility 
be prevented? Politics only, as a way to bring different people together, 
could triumph over social dissonances. Yet, according to historian Bethwell 
Ogot who recently took stock of the nationalist project and of Kenyan 
identity, such kind of politics is missing today. Consequently, the study 
of social changes cannot omit a political and cultural analysis because the 
country is without or is in search of a national and social pact… and has 
actually been since independence.22
4. Kenya without a Social or National Pact,  
in the Grip of Symbolic Violence
From the first decades of independence to the transition of 1990, social 
divisions are present, but accepted. This social state is alive in the shape 
of muted acceptance which Josiah Mwangi Kariuki had condemned. The 
lines of separation were then still racial, neo-colonial, even regional and 
social. In view of this, the enrichment of national leaders and of their 
families, originally poor for most of them, was cast as the good fortune 
of the victors: it was an individual revenge rather than a social fact. 
These leaders neither belonged to a traditional African aristocratic elite, 
then non-existent, nor to the African economic elite already emerging or 
established, with the exception of a few.23 Thus social inequality became 
22. See the latest publication on this topic: Mwangi, Opongo & Wahome (2019).
23. Recently, scholarly biographies of nationalist leaders (e.g. Paul Ngei) and 
Kenya’s great political families have tremendously increased, notably focusing 
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Africanised, yet without the racial connotations of the colonial period, by 
drawing from conformist, if not unequal so-called traditional community 
values. This social architecture was later maintained by authoritarian 
political systems, the neo-patrimonial nature of the state which politico-
economic dynasties and a managerial and business petit bourgeoisie 
benefited from. This elite expanded, diversified and renewed itself from 
the top by co-opting the newly promoted, the “big men” and those under 
them, such as intermediaries and officials who were often the “broker-cum-
clients” within such a pyramid system (Kidombo 2007). This domination 
and social peace suited Western partners concerned with geopolitical 
stability during the Cold War, especially at that time when the status quo 
contributed to civil peace. In effect inequalities are thus managed, ritualised, 
and somehow digested by imagery, rhetoric and political practices which 
since independence had been based on the national and moral values of 
sharing, solidarity, redistribution an pooling, that is, of the “all together” 
of Harambee—the national motto under President Kenyatta. Moreover, this 
nationalist political culture, confirmed and followed by the Nyayo regime 
(nyanyo meaning “the trace” in Swahili) of President Daniel arap Moi, 
resonated within the community and ethnic ethos of family and community 
accomplishment, success, advancement, seniority, and social conformity. 
Religious discourses also resounded with references to these values and 
contributed to the building of Kenyan identities.
In the name of this national pact, mobilising all Kenyans thus helps to 
symbolically and materially correct the inequalities. This happens, firstly, 
through community work—a model which the nationalist nations of 
East Africa all share—and, secondly, through exchanges, compensations 
and distributions that tacitly materialise the social contract, beyond the 
political pact. The successive regimes of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel 
arap Moi instrumentalised this social “pact-contract” through political 
patronage and both institutionalised and ritualised it through speeches and 
slogans, through practices and symbols. Various very tangible gifts resulted 
from these in a ceremonial manner. Land was the first of these gifts, as 
well as commercial opportunities and profits, public amenities and social 
community projects, individual promotions, equipment and so on. The 
distribution of consumable products was the second type of gift, such as 
maize in times of scarcity or milk for school children. Local and territorial 
communities, often gendered, thus benefited from some of these exchanges, 
donations and takings which were sponsored and mediated by all the actors 
of the politico-administration. In reality patronage and clientelism were 
rapidly overtaking the original form of self-mobilisation, transforming 
on the Kenyattas, the Mois and the Odingas. Others are about “big men,” such as 
Charles Njonjo (Médard 2012).
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Kenyan citizens into “political beggars.” Such a system reached its peak in 
the Moi era, a one-party regime, by integrating the periphery through the 
relay of local bosses, the “big men.”
For a time, this redistribution—which is also a sort of politico-social 
evergetism—acted as a very strong social bound, despite the fact that is 
unequally favoured ethnic groups, allies, and partisans. It maintained 
links with the communities at the bottom and built an imagined national 
community, with the added bonus that it regulated in this way the foundations 
the regime in place by renewing its competing local elites. However, such 
a contract-pact, which also included support for the cooperatives (with 
780,000 members in 1975 from a population of 13.5  million: see Kanogo 
1990) and the strengthening of the public and administrative authority, the 
public bureaucracy and public companies, was only possible to the extent 
that the financial and economic margins of the ruling power was grounded 
upon a prosperous parastatal economy. This was the case for many reasons 
until the mid-1970s, until the 1980s and then 1990 when the depressive 
economic context giving less resources to the state, together with the 
authoritarian drift, poor governance, and the political transition failed 
this social contract-pact (Grignon & Maupeu 1998). The ethnic-political 
conflicts of the transition then gained the upper hand and sowed the seeds 
of a “moral ethnicity,” which is another type of pact.
Since then, this national and social pact, already dormant on the political 
level—as the political lines of the main political parties converge in an 
assured liberal perspective according to which redistribution is a function 
of the economy only—has broken down. Its rectification is still desired 
through a second Harambee (Equal Rights Trust & Kenya Human Rights 
Commission 2012).
As such the underlying and cold violence, apparent in the regimes of 
poverty as well as in social inequality and to which the country seems to 
have become accustomed, is therefore not solely social but has also become 
a symbolic if not moral violence. This happened progressively as Kenya’s 
nationalist model, which was based more on regulation than integration, 
which was more cultural than political, has become defective. We contend 
that ultimately this failing has been compensated by the recourse to 
ethnicity and then to religiosity.
Since the 1990s, the danger has started to show and translated into 
either a mass explosive social blaze owing to accumulated frustrations or 
a silent ethnic conflict. Both situations awaken and join up during every 
significant event, that is, during social conflicts, through politico-social 
protest movements like those which militias represent, and during political 
and election fever, which spreads the aspirations of the youth, the new 
generations, and specific age groups. The mobilisation of the youth into 
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militias as well as the social dramatisation of the post-electoral crisis of 
2007–08 are an illustration and a peak point of these phenomena. Low-
intensity violence is also a daily experience at community level, in the 
streets, in families, and within household. And domestic violence is rising 
sharply24 as traditional, family, and community models of regulating 
tensions do no longer manage it as they were in the past and do no longer 
have the moral authority required for doing so.
What is more, it is feared that in the future the chains of social inequality 
might once again play on socio-political tensions—social inequality between 
towns and cities, between territory-defined populations and within them, 
between the old and the young, between men and women, and between 
nationals, foreigners and marginalised people, the last ones being de facto 
dependent on humanitarian action. Identity, ethnic, and religious answers 
and ways to shut from the others might also arise, which in Kenya have 
already been at play, or even forms of Messianism, escapism and anomy. 
Eventually, wandering and aimless individuals and groups might increase 
in number and be captured or exploited by terrorist strategies as much in 
cities as in the countryside.
Through these fragile social bonds and relations, it is clearly the ethnic 
question that dominates the social scene—or the “tribal” question if one 
retains the official terminology in use (“ethnic affiliations, tribes and 
nationalities”). At least it is the construction and uses of rigid identities 
that deserve to be addressed. Such identities are indeed both exclusive and 
violent, especially in times of open or muffled but also hopefully protective 
crises, yet crises that are always kept in memory. Social history therefore 
cannot do without a cultural and identity-aware approach.
5. Ethnicised Social Relations:  
Has Ethnicity Replaced Class?
Kenyan society appears to be more and more divided along ethnic lines, 
so much so that it appears that ethnicity has taken the place of class, or at 
least become pervasive in the understanding of social and human relations. 
While only 2% of Kenyans self-identify as “Kenyans,”25 the declared 
ethnic affiliations—but is it through an exclusive sense of affiliation?—are 
essential even though internal social differences are growing irrespective 
of ethnic group. Has the ethnic struggle replaced the class struggle, as well 
24. See the data in the different DHS surveys on the reality and the perception 
of domestic gender violence.
25. This might include, among others, naturalised Asians who do not declare 
themselves to be “Kenyan Asians.” Since July  2017, “Asian” is politically 
recognised as Kenya’s 44th “tribe.”
Christian Thibon
20
as the racial struggle? Might imagined community equality and expected 
fraternity—of rank and status—26 help to accept or even erase social 
differences? To answer these questions, we are now turning to history and 
historical sociology, as ethnic groups are historical constructs.
Today the ethnic reality prevails. The 43 “ethnicities and nationalities” 
in place since independence (and 44 since 2017) tacitly and officially 
recognised this reality on a social-cultural level. Among them, some 
“ethnicities” are considered “central” given their demographic strength in 
some regions and because they are represented throughout the country 
(census data 2009) as follows: the Kikuyu 17%, the Luhya 13.7%, the Kalenjin 
12.7%, the Luo 10.8%, the Kamba 10%, then the Somali 6%, the Kisii 5%, 
the Mijikenda 5%, and the Meru 4.1%. Besides them, there are “peripheral” 
ethnic groups characterised as regional or even territorial minorities, which 
also include the “nationalities” such as the Asian Kenyans, White Kenyans, 
Arab Kenyans and “indigenous people.” This ethnic division is undergoing 
internal changes due to differing population growth rates and fertility 
rates, as some regional groups have entered demographic transition while 
the pastoral communities are seeing strong growth.
This multicultural presence and ethnic diversity are part of Kenyan 
history and heritage. The longue durée historical perspective necessary 
to apprehend population settlements, the diffusion of languages (Nilotic, 
Bantu, Cushitic, Swahili…), techniques and material cultures, and cultural 
practices and exchanges, reveals differentiated constructions. Such 
constructions have changed because of particular demographic, pastoralist 
and agro-pastoralist mechanisms—impacting upon patterns of settlement, 
territorial expansion and growth—as well as because of social-economic, 
ecological, and social-cultural dynamics and due to the geopolitical 
context. These more or less favourable interactions stem from and have 
built diversity but also inequality in so-called traditional societies on the 
demographic, economic and geopolitical front: all of this explains the 
historical difference between the central ethnic groups and the peripheral 
ethnic groups. However, “ethnogenesis,” that is, the construction of ethnic 
territories and identities, seems more recent. It was reinforced in the 
nineteenth  century when the populations came into contact as a result 
of demographic growth, thus creating internal tension and even external 
conflicts, even though, at that time, ethnic borders were still fluid and inter-
ethnic exchanges frequent.27 Remarkably this construction did not result in 
state formations: there was no monarchy or aristocracy in Kenya except for 
26. See the number of ethnic declarants who do not report their clan or subtribe.
27. All great theses of regional history by Bethwell Allan Ogot, William 
Ochieng, Godfrey Muriuki, Henry Mwanzi… note the porous nature of borders 
between tribes in the nineteenth century before colonisation.
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embryonic forms (e.g. the city-states of the coast, and the Wanga state) and 
for a few occasional leaders, “big men,” warlords and precolonial prophets.
Secondly, colonisation administratively entrenched racial categories 
and ethnic identities, territorialised them and exploited them without, 
however, attributing more or less value, or fewer or greater privileges to 
certain ethnic groups to the detriment of others, unlike what happened 
in other neighbouring colonised areas. In the Kenyan colonial regime, 
the appointment of chiefs remained the responsibility of the colonial 
administration and was never mediated by a customary ethnic authority 
as seen in monarchies and chieftaincies elsewhere in Africa. For its local 
administration and army, the colonial power exploited local resources; for 
labour or clerical assistants, it drew on central ethnic groups geographically 
associated with colonial exploitation; and for its military force it recruited 
from the peripheral ethnic groups perceived more as warriors and more apt 
to the arms profession—a process that in some cases contributed to inventing 
ethnic groups, like the creation of the Nubians. Thus, while the central ethnic 
groups, including the Kikuyu, were the most favoured through proximity 
to colonial power or through new economic trends or even by the reforms 
of the 1950s,28 they were also the most penalised by it. This style of colonial 
management and this proximity, this encounter between the colonial world 
and certain ethnic groups, is also reflected in the emergences of indigenous 
elites, the junior civil servants, the clergymen. They produced narratives 
and nationalist identity writings that blended traditions and borrowings 
from certain religious political conceptions of modernity (Peterson 2012). 
These types of “invented tradition” (Ranger 1985) and ethnic patriotism 
of the “small homeland” (petite patrie) compensated for the weakness of 
the political ethnic legacy. This local elite participated in the nationalist 
claim and then struggled for independence which prepositioned them 
to a national destiny. Upon gaining independence and although regional 
strife, fuelled partly by the racial question (the place of racial minorities 
and particularly that of the Asians), was perceptible between central ethnic 
groups (the Kikuyu and the Luo) and the peripheral ethnic groups or divided 
centres (like the Luhya, the Kalenjin, the Mijikenda), the national sentiment 
outshone feelings of ethnic belonging and supported a national associative 
project that nevertheless lacked a “national high culture,” principally a 
national language that was then neither English nor Swahili.
Thus, in Kenya, as anywhere else—and perhaps even more so—, the 
proclaimed nation is even less a natural given: it is a historical contemporary 
28. Including the Swynnerton plan for the privatisation and redistribution of 
land in 1952, the authorisation of farm plantations, indigenous trade in certain 
areas, recruitment of personnel with a background in industrialisation, in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.
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invention, a geo-economic, institutional, political construction, without 
long-term filiation except for the territorial, administrative and geopolitical 
framework inherited from colonialism. Moreover, this nation only a single 
objective: “nationalism,” which was the history of present time as well as 
the collective destiny of a cultural, social and political modernisation in 
its beginning stage. However, at the time of independence, the national 
consensus was dominated by a project of “African-Kenyan Socialism” 
blending political democracy, well-being, a mixed economy and self-
sufficiency, and the progressive Africanisation of inheritance and jobs, under 
which ethnic groups did not have the right to political citizenship but to 
cultural citizenship. Yet the latter structured daily political life and impacted 
the national life but in an unequal manner, because historical processes 
differentiated them on many levels, granting some of them intellectual, 
economic, geopolitical, and demographic primacy. But political actors and 
political parties, with their strategies of conquest and maintaining power, 
increasingly played this reality, pulling the strings of ethnicity under the 
cover of nationalist rhetoric and through authoritarian practices. This had 
already been the case since independence, in the construction of parties, 
regional alliances and then ethnic alliance (including the KANU-KADU 
division), then ethnocentrism as an exercise of power. Ethnic preference 
was used in the management of power and in access to the state, to its 
services and redistribution, as well as tribalism to conquer and stay in 
power. This tendency was reinforced even more when political life became 
democratic, at least competitive. From the transition of the 1990s, indeed, 
politics both instrumentalised the ethnic factor and was trapped by it and 
by its power of demographic mobilisation deployed at each election. “The 
tyranny of numbers”29 therefore prevailed by corrupting and playing up 
the “moral ethnicity” unique to each society (Berman & Lonsdale 1992). 
Finally, the political disruptions and even more so, political crises—often 
due to identity manipulation—took root because of the litany of human and 
universal tragedies and the ascending collective violence they triggered, 
leaving in their wake painful memories and conficting identities.
The decades of independence—and even more during the transition and 
the democratic period—therefore contributed to the exclusive consolidation 
of ethnic identities, which neither the precolonial nor the colonial period 
had produced, or if so, perhaps only partially. Tribalism in its various forms 
and through authoritarian, autocratic and even democratic implementations 
also took part in it. For these reasons, the ethnicisation of society appears 
to be a top-down process that stems from strategies devised by political 
elites at various levels through the manipulation of ethnic identity for 
29. In the words of political scientist Mutahi Ngunyi during the 2013 elections 
(see also Thibon, Fouéré, Ndeda & Mwangi 2014).
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their immediate gain—be it a politico-economic or a social gain—via 
political client-patron networks. Thus, social differentiation, territorial 
discriminations, the creation of millionaires as well as the emergence of 
a managerial public middle class, who are sometimes perceived as the 
brokers of the politico-economic elite, are the direct or indirect product of 
ethnicisation.
However, we should not ignore a powerful bottom-up movement 
grounded upon the conjunction of many reasoned behaviours seeking 
advancement and survival, the resilience of the “ethnic groups of beggars-
clients,” and the many attitudes that illustrate identity tension in reaction 
to the often-destructive process of socio-cultural modernisation with 
the objective to manage the malaise suffered by family and community 
structures. Such a movement is all the stronger when it is relayed through 
writing and language, even more when modern mass media is involved. 
This ethnic retreat, this ethnicity from rural and urban societies weakened 
by modernisation clings to a tradition or lost authority. This is illustrated 
by the millenarian militia, the culture clashes, the masculinity crisis and 
the authoritarian fold around traditional authorities (age classes and the 
elders). We often tend to forget those who have lost everything, who do 
not sink collectively into social anomie but cling to “what remains when we 
have lost everything,”: and what remains is culture, even if reinvented. Such 
a process is also true for the middle classes and concern both the old small 
managerial promoted bourgeoisie whose strategies of social meritocratic 
ascension are indebted to ethnic mediations, and the recent middle class 
that is a bit less permeable to identity-related pressures. Both resort to 
moral ethnicity and appropriate ethnic patriotism for security purposes or 
social distinction, which plunges into tribalism during time of crisis.
Thus, the ethnicisation from above has found a reactive echo in society, 
especially as the suffering endured during these socio-political crises—
which Kenyans experience as an intermittent civil war they are scared 
of—have given the people an additional memory of a sensitive nature. 
We would not then be facing 2 or 3 Kenyas but closer to 4 Kenyas, with 
the risk of seeing some leaders or local political classes play the card of 
decentralised ethnicity.
Conclusion
Closely observing Kenyan society in the twenty-first century and putting 
it into context bring to light complex dynamics that cannot easily be 
captured in the idea that there are “two Kenyas” based upon a binary 
dividing line inherited from colonisation and reproduced the decades of 
the independences. Rather, “three Kenyas” emerge with their own social 
spaces, if not their ethnic-focused spaces. This complex character becomes 
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even more obvious as we take into account not only income, well-being, 
and politico-ethnic behaviours, but also cultural changes. Some of these 
changes are silent but observable in everyday practices by looking at 
collective behaviours and habits, the effects of education and digital booms, 
access to media, language usage, the demographic transition of households, 
and more generally modernisation and acculturation. Other changes 
are less visible, or even invisible, except in times of overt crisis, as they 
relate to perception and religious practices, collective sensitivities, gender 
relations and diverging identities that may be divisive. The socio-cultural 
differentiation at work is more complex than we first thought. It reveals 
silent changes that can perhaps be seen in a more optimistic light than the 
one we used in this chapter to depict the inevitability of social trends. Such 
a move requires switching from the panoramic and longitudinal approach 
adopted here to the analysis of social trajectories through the use of a cross-
sectional survey or monographic observation.
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